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I. INTRODUCTION
ICHARD works with Susan at the telephone company. Richard
is a devout Christian who believes, according to the Bible, that
homosexuality is a sin. Susan is an openly lesbian woman, and
recently, Richard gave her a pamphlet containing Biblical scriptures con-
demning homosexuality. Susan finds this action deeply, personally offen-
sive, and she fears that Richard will hold her to a double standard or pass
her up for promotions because of her sexual orientation. After Susan
complains to the human resources department, Richard's supervisor asks
him to refrain from speaking to Susan about her sexual orientation, but
Richard protests that he has made a personal vow to God to speak the
word of God as a "living witness" against homosexuality.'
The telephone company is in a state that does not have a local statute
banning employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
The company has a sexual harassment policy, but the policy does not
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law; B.A.
2008, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA. I would like to thank Professor Ellen J.
Pryor for her valuable feedback. Thank you to my partner Sarah and my family for their
unwavering support in all that I do, including this Article.
1. See, e.g.,Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995).
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touch on religious or sexual orientation discrimination. If the telephone
company disciplines Richard, for example, by terminating his employ-
ment, could the company be liable in a wrongful termination suit? If the
company permits Richard to continue sharing his antihomosexual beliefs,
does Susan have any recourse in the law because her employer has ig-
nored her reports of harassment? Or is there some third option, in which
the employer must allow Richard some accommodation that satisfies his
religious needs but does not create a hostile work environment for
Susan?
Most employers are subject to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,2 the well-known federal law that protects employees from discrimi-
nation in their jobs due to their "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."'3 Although Congress originally intended Title VII to combat ra-
cial intolerance in the workplace, these other classes were added to the
statute before its passage and today form the basis of the expanding prac-
tice area of employment law.4 Because Title VII applies to religious em-
ployees but not homosexual employees, 5 the telephone company in the
hypothetical may feel that it has more of a duty to protect Richard from
discrimination than Susan. In fact, there is no federal law prohibiting em-
ployers from making adverse employment decisions regarding their les-
bian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) employees. 6 The telephone
company faces a difficult decision-if it fails to establish some sort of
reasonable accommodation for Richard's religious practices, it may be
subject to a religious discrimination suit. But if the telephone company
chooses to permit Richard's behavior to continue unabated, it risks sacri-
ficing the happiness and productivity of other employees, including Su-
san, who may find Richard's religious practices particularly offensive and
disruptive.7 At the same time, the telephone company wants all of its
employees to be happy so that it can have an efficient and productive
workplace.
This Comment examines the interaction between sexual orientation
and religion in the workplace and how the current state of the law can
produce a variety of confusing, contradictory, and often surprising results.
Today's employers seek to promote a diverse workforce to be viable in
the global marketplace. 8 However, because religious employees enjoy a
wide variety of statutory protections for their religious practices and be-
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
4. H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393, 2401,
2513-17.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
6. See Shawn Clancy, Note, The Queer Truth: The Need to Update Title VII to Include
Sexual Orientation, 37 J. LEGIS. 119, 126 (2011); Zachary A. Kramer, Note, The Ultimate
Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gender-Conforming and Gender-Nonconforming Homosex-
uals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 465, 471.
7. See Hunter C. Carroll, Note, Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don't. The
Collision Between Religion and the Workplace Has Employers Caught in the Middle, 20
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 353, 377 (1997).
8. See Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 608 (9th Cir. 2004).
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liefs, employers must sometimes compromise to allow potentially irritat-
ing or unwelcome conduct in order to provide reasonable
accommodations for their religious employees. 9
Part II of this Comment discusses the evolution of religious discrimina-
tion under Title VII. Part III examines how sexual orientation has been
excluded from Title VII and the ways in which LGBT plaintiffs have been
marginally successful in bringing certain types of gender-discrimination
claims. Part IV highlights some of the most influential cases in which
religion and sexual orientation have played tug-of-war at work and in the
courtroom. Finally, Part V explores various scenarios and how employers
are likely to react under the current state of the law. However, because
the law leaves many questions unanswered, employers will probably be
left feeling confused about how to proceed when confronted with em-
ployees whose core ideological values strongly conflict with those of their
coworkers.
II. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
After Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, many debated
about how the Act defined "religion."10 Courts originally distinguished
between religious belief and observance, with many lower courts holding
that Title VII required the protection of religious belief but not religious
observance." The original statute prohibited discrimination based on re-
ligion, but it did not require employers to affirmatively provide any ac-
commodation to religious employees. 12 In 1972, following the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) issuance of guidelines
suggesting that employers should provide reasonable accommodations
without undue hardship, Congress enacted the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972 (EEOA). 13 With a goal of "assur[ing] that freedom
from religious discrimination in the employment of workers is for all time
guaranteed by law,"' 14 the EEOA amended Title VII to require an em-
ployer to provide a religious employee with reasonable accommodation
for his or her religious observance, provided that the accommodation did
not impose undue hardship on the employer. 15 The EEOA explicitly de-
fined "religion" as "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
9. Id. at 607.
10. Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommo-
dation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 361-62 (1997).
11. Id. at 362.
12. See id. at 363.
13. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Relig-
ion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1967).
14. Nantiya Ruan, Accommodating Respectful Religious Expression in the Workplace,
92 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 14-15 & n.60 (2008) (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 705-06 (1972) (state-
ment of Sen. Jennings Randolph, "sponsor and chief proponent of the 1972
amendments")).
15. See Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir.
1981).
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well as belief,"'1 6 although it did not define what constituted an "obser-
vance," "practice," or "belief."
In 1980, the EEOC responded to confusion over the definition of "re-
ligion" with its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion. 17 The
Guidelines explained that they "do not confine the definition of religious
practices to theistic concepts or to traditional religious beliefs,"'18 and
"[t]he fact that no religious group espouses such beliefs or the fact that
the religious group to which the individual professes to belong may not
accept such belief will not determine whether the belief is a religious be-
lief."'19 This definition has remained unchanged since 1980.20
An employee seeking to establish a religious discrimination claim
under Title VII can bring disparate-treatment, disparate-impact, harass-
ment, or failure-to-accommodate claims against his or her employer. 21 A
prima facie case for individual disparate treatment on the basis of religion
must show that an employee (1) "has a bona fide religious belief that
conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) informed the employer of
this belief" and conflict; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action
as a result of failing to comply with this requirement.22 A religious dispa-
rate-treatment claim asserts that "some term, condition or privilege of
employment" reflects the employer's intention to discriminate against
employees because of their religion. 23 Second, a disparate-impact claim
challenges a facially neutral employment practice as having a negative
effect on the employee because of his or her religion-these are rare but
possible.24 Third, a harassment claim is similar to a disparate-treatment
claim. 25 Title VII does not apply to claims against fellow employees.
26
Religious harassment claims must therefore be against employers and
typically feature one of the following scenarios: employees will sue em-
16. Sec. 2(7), § 7010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).
17. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,610 (Oct. 31,
1980) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (2011)).
18. Id. at 72,611.
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2011).
20. Engle, supra note 10, at 386.
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Specifically, Title VII states that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id.
22. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1986); Smith v. Pyro Min-
ing Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1084 (6th Cir. 1987).
23. Theresa M. Beiner & John M.A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious
Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 577, 582 (1997).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 582-83.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006).
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ployers for permitting religious employees to engage in conduct that is
alleged to harass fellow employees; religious employees who are sub-
jected to inappropriate conduct by fellow employees will sue their em-
ployers for failing to protect them from such harassment; or religious
employees may feel "harassed based on [their] religious beliefs due to the
conduct of coworkers that is not religious in nature" and will sue employ-
ers for failing to protect them.27
Finally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 also provided
that employers must provide reasonable accommodations to an em-
ployee's or prospective employee's religious observance unless such ac-
commodations would place undue hardship on the employer.28 A
religious accommodation claim is distinct from a disparate-treatment
claim. The latter alleges that employees are treated unequally, but the
former focuses on whether the employer has complied with its duty to
provide reasonable accommodation for an employee's sincerely held re-
ligious beliefs and practices. 29 Unlike other classes covered by Title VII,
religious employees add a distinct layer of difficulty to employers' at-
tempts to police workplace discrimination. The statute not only prohibits
religious discrimination but also places on employers an affirmative duty
to provide reasonable accommodations for employees to practice their
religion as long as they do not impose undue hardship on the employer. 30
Moreover, Title VII does not provide definitions or even guidelines as to
what constitutes a "reasonable accommodation"or "undue hardship. '31
Not surprisingly, courts have struggled to interpret these phrases. 32
In 1977, the Supreme Court first addressed this question in Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, in which the Court examined an airline's
obligation to accommodate its employee's Sabbatarian religious beliefs.33
After Hardison's employer asked him to work during the Sabbath, Hardi-
son suggested that his employer should require him to work only four
days a week. The company rejected this proposal (as well as other alter-
natives that would have inconvenienced it or other employees) and sub-
sequently terminated Hardison's employment. 34 Hardison filed a
religious discrimination claim, alleging that the company had failed to
provide a reasonable accommodation for his religious beliefs.35 The Su-
preme Court held that "reasonable accommodation" does not require an
27. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 23, at 594-95.
28. Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 2(7), § 7010), 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).
29. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 23, at 582-83,
30. Carroll, supra note 7, at 353-54.
31. See Beadle v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11th Cir. 1994).
In fact, the statute does not define any type of discrimination, presumably to give broad
leeway for courts to find a particular practice or policy discriminatory. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(j).
32. See Beadle, 29 F.3d at 592.
33. 432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977).
34. Id. at 68-69.
35. Id. at 69.
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employer to submit itself to lost efficiency or higher wages. 36 In fact,
"[t]o require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give
Hardison Saturdays off" would be an undue hardship.37 The Court re-
fused to "construe the statute to require an employer to discriminate
against some employees in order to enable others to observe their Sab-
bath. '38 In other words, if the employer can prove a real cost to its oper-
ations not "based on theory, assumption, or hypothetical facts," then
courts are likely to relieve the employer of its duty to provide reasonable
accommodations. 39 The Court has also suggested that reasonable accom-
modations do not require an employer to violate its collective bargaining
agreement.40 Employers may also be able to defend against a discrimina-
tion claim by showing that they offered a reasonable accommodation but,
for whatever reason, the employee refused to accept it.41
The EEOC's 1980 Guidelines clarified the reasonable accommodation
language in response to confusion over the Hardison decision.42 The
Guidelines explained that if an employer has a range of reasonable ac-
commodations to pick from that do not cause undue hardship, the em-
ployer must choose the accommodation that least disadvantages the
religious employee.4 3
Another key case in the analysis of reasonable accommodation and un-
due hardship is Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook.44 Philbrook
was a high school business and typing teacher and a follower of the
Worldwide Church of God.45 His faith prohibited him from working on
designated religious holidays, which occurred about six times per year.46
However, Philbrook's collective bargaining agreement provided leave for
only three religious holidays per year and limited the uses of other allot-
ted personal leave days. 47 Consequently, Philbrook either scheduled hos-
pital visits or worked on holy days.48 Finding both arrangements
unfavorable, he therefore requested that the school board allow him ei-
ther to use additional personal leave days for religious observance, his
preferred resolution, or allow him to pay for his own substitute teacher
and receive his regular pay for additional religious holidays that he took
off.4 9 The school board rejected both proposals and discharged Phil-
36. Id. at 84.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 85.
39. Julia Spoor, Note, Go Tell It on the Mountain, but Keep It Out of the Office: Relig-
ious Harassment in the Workplace, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 971, 987 (1997); see also Brown v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 1979).
40. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986).
41. See id. at 69.
42. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (2011).
43. Id. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii).
44. 479 U.S. at 60.
45. Id. at 62.
46. Id. at 62-63.
47. Id. at 64.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 64-65.
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brook for refusing to comply with the attendance policy. Philbrook
thereafter filed a complaint for employment discrimination based on his
religion. 50
Examining whether the school board reasonably accommodated Phil-
brook's religious requirements, the Supreme Court found that nothing in
Title VII requires an employer to accept an employee's proposed accom-
modations.51 Instead, an employer can provide any accommodations it
chooses, so long as the trier of fact finds it reasonable, to defeat a poten-
tial claimant's discrimination claim.5 2
The Ansonia Court determined that any accommodation that the em-
ployer chooses to provide and a trier of fact finds reasonable defeats the
claimant's discrimination claim, even if it is not the accommodation that
the claimant sought or desired. The Court held that a reasonable accom-
modation "eliminates the conflict between [the employee's] employment
requirements and religious practices."'53 Thus, it provided an explanation
to determine whether an accommodation is reasonable. The Court then
remanded the case to decide whether the school board's leave policy was
in fact a reasonable accommodation. 54
Even if an employee establishes that he or she has a sincerely held
religious belief that conflicts with some employment practice or policy,
the employer knew of that conflict, and the employer failed to provide a
reasonable accommodation, the employer may still provide an affirmative
defense. An employer can argue that it could not reasonably accommo-
date the employee's religious beliefs due to undue hardship or that the
employee rejected the accommodations. 55
Usually, this type of litigation does not center on whether the em-
ployee's conduct is religious in nature, because it is within the court's
discretion to decide that question as a matter of law. Instead most litiga-
tion centers on whether the employer has provided a reasonable accom-
modation.5 6 For example, the Fifth Circuit has held that reasonable
accommodations fall under two general categories: "(1) an employee can
be accommodated in his or her current position by changing the working
conditions, or (2) the employer can offer to let the employee transfer to
another reasonably comparable position where conflicts are less likely to
arise."' 57 While the undue hardship and reasonable accommodation lan-
guage was intended to create a balance between employee and employer
interests, this balance is often upset when the employer must consider the
interests of various employees against each other.58 At the same time,
50. Id.
51. Id. at 68.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 70.
54. Id. at 71.
55. See Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 23, at 600.
56. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972).
57. Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2001).
58. Engle, supra note 10, at 405.
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courts agree that the religious employee must be willing to cooperate
with the employer in determining a reasonable accommodation.5 9 The
duty to cooperate applies only once the employee has made his or her
religious belief known to the employer and the employer has attempted
to provide a reasonable accommodation. 60 Although some courts have
found otherwise, most have found that the religious employee is not re-
quired to compromise his or her religious beliefs.61 Interestingly, because
of the affirmative duty to provide reasonable accommodation under Title
VII, religious discrimination claims are the only Title VII claims that ac-
tually require disparate treatment of employees rather than an attempt to
eradicate it.62
In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). 63 This Act prohibited federal, state, and local governments
from substantially limiting an employee's free exercise of religion absent
a showing of a compelling interest for the government action and evi-
dence that the action had been narrowly tailored to meet the compelling
interest.64 Furthermore, it created "a presumption that government regu-
lation is unconstitutional when it substantially burdens an employee's re-
ligious exercise."'65 While it did not come into play with every Title VII
religious discrimination case, the RFRA created a federal claim for "per-
sons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government. '66
This meant that if an employer attempted to defend itself against a fail-
ure-to-accommodate claim by stating that it had to comply with a federal,
state, or local law, the court would evaluate the claim under an RFRA
framework rather than a Title VII framework to determine if the em-
ployee had a federal claim.67 However, in 1997, the United States Su-
preme Court held that Congress exceeded its authority provided under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, rendering RFRA
unconstitutional. 68
Some scholars suggest that despite the fact that religious employees
have even more protections from discrimination than other employees
because of the additional safeguards provided by the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, it is relatively easier to prove a hostile work envi-
ronment claim based on the actions of a religious employee than a claim
59. See, e.g., Hudson v. W. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 261, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1988).
60. See Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1993).
61. Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII's Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Pro-
tection of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 575, 600 (2000).
62. Engle, supra note 10, at 405-06.
63. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488,
invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 3.
66. Id. § 2(b)(2).
67. Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Restoring Religious Freedom to the Workplace:
Title VII, RFRA and Religious Accommodation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2513, 2528 (1996).
68. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
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against a secular, nonreligious employee. 69 Theresa A. Beiner and John
M. A. DiPippa even go so far as to say that the explanation for this phe-
nomenon is "the courts' preference for religious claims by nonreligious
employees over those of religious employees," in which "nonreligious
employees" are "those employees who ... are motivated by their lack of
an organized religious belief or reaction to the beliefs of those identified
with such a religion."' 70 However, this argument is untenable-courts do
not simply take the side of the party whose belief system least bothers
them. Moreover, although Beiner and DiPippa argue that "courts are
reluctant to give way to the religious employee's practices in the face of
resulting time robbing," their analysis disregards the intent of the law and
instead focuses on a perceived secularization of both the courts and the
workplace. 71
For example, the authors examine Wilson v. U.S. West Communica-
tions, a controversial case out of the Eighth Circuit featuring a female
Roman Catholic employee named Wilson who wore an anti-abortion pin
featuring an eighteen-to-twenty-week-old fetus as part of a vow she made
to combat abortion.72 The employer noticed that employees were dis-
tracted by the button, some of whom went on to make formal complaints,
finding the graphic image personally offensive.73 Wilson's supervisors of-
fered her three accommodations: "(1) wear the button only in her work
cubicle, leaving the button in the cubicle when she moved around the
office; (2) cover the button while at work; or (3) wear a different button
with the same message but without the photograph. '74 Wilson refused all
three, believing that any accommodation that did not allow her to visibly
display the button at all times during work "would break her promise to
God."'75 After a series of meetings with no resolution, the company ter-
minated Wilson's employment because she chose to stay home from work
for three consecutive days rather than return to work without the but-
ton.76 Wilson subsequently filed suit for religious discrimination under
Title VII. 77
The district court found that two of the proposed accommodations
were not reasonable because they violated Wilson's religious vow to wear
the button at all times as a "living witness" to God, but concluded that
the third proposal, covering the button while at work, was a reasonable
accommodation. 78 The court held that Wilson's vow to wear the button
"until there was an end to abortion or until [she] could no longer fight the
fight" did not include being a "living witness" as part of a sincerely held
69. See, e.g., Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 23, at 577.
70. Id. at 580.
71. See id. at 601-02.




76. Id. at 1339-40.
77. Id. at 1340.
78. Id.
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religious belief. 79 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that there was no
evidence that Wilson's vow required her to be a living witness.80 The
appellate court summarized the difficult position in which Wilson's ac-
tions placed her employer:
Although Wilson's religious beliefs did not create scheduling con-
flicts or violate dress code or safety rules, Wilson's position would
require U.S. West to allow Wilson to impose her beliefs as she
chooses. Wilson concedes the button caused substantial disruption
at work. To simply instruct Wilson's co-workers that they must ac-
cept Wilson's insistence on wearing a particular depiction of a fetus
as part of her religious beliefs is antithetical to the concept of reason-
able accommodation. 81
Because the court concluded that the employee's vow did not require
her to be a living witness, it found that the suggestion to cover her button
while at work was a reasonable accommodation. 82 Therefore, the relig-
ious discrimination claim was denied. 83 Notably, the court concluded
with the strong guidance that "Title VII does not require an employer to
allow an employee to impose his religious views on others. The employer
is only required to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious
views." 84
Beiner and DiPippa argue that the court's decision only reveals its "dis-
dain" for Wilson's religious beliefs and that it "should not have consid-
ered the quality of her belief in deciding her case."85 But this is exactly
what any court must do when considering religious discrimination claims.
The first step of the prima facie discrimination analysis is to determine
that the employee has a bona fide religious belief;86 the court does not
need to moralize the belief, but it does need to decide if the belief truly
exists. If the court does not investigate whether a claimant holds a sin-
cere religious belief, then any employee actions that do not comply with
employment standards could hide behind a shield of religious belief. The
issue is not, as these authors allege, that the court declined to protect a
valid religious belief because it contradicted mainstream values; instead,
the court found that being a living witness was not part of Wilson's sin-
cerely held religious beliefs and thus her employer could instruct her to
cover the pin.8 7
This Part has discussed how federal law has developed to protect relig-
ious and nonreligious employees from religious discrimination in the
workplace. Because the definitions of "reasonable accommodation" and
79. Id. at 1339-40 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. at 1340-41.
81. Id. at 1341.
82. Id. at 1341-42.
83. Id. at 1342.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 23, at 603.
86. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1986).
87. See Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1341; Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 23, at 604.
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"undue hardship" are constantly debated and each case hinges on com-
plex facts, it is difficult to determine whether a court will find for an em-
ployer or an employee in any given discrimination claim. Title VII works
to provide religious employees with a relatively formidable amount of
protection from discrimination-arguably more than provided for other
protected categories-due to the employer's additional affirmative duty
to provide a reasonable accommodation. Consequently, it is not always
clear how an employee's religious convictions against homosexuality
should be handled in the workplace. The next Part examines the protec-
tions against discrimination, or lack thereof, that federal law provides for
LGBT employees.
III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION: THE (LACK
OF) PROTECTION PROVIDED UNDER FEDERAL LAW
While Title VII prohibits employment discrimination "because of...
sex,'"88 courts have unwaveringly held that this language does not extend
to protection against sexual orientation discrimination.89 In fact, the
drafters of this portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not even intend
to include "sex" under the enumerated protections.90 In an ironic twist,
hoping to defeat the bill, Virginia Representative Howard Smith added
an amendment to the act to include "sex" as a protected class; however,
surely much to Smith's dismay, Congress passed the amended bill.9 ' Be-
cause the amendment was introduced just a day before the vote was
taken, little legislative history exists to guide courts about how to apply
the provision.92 Left to their own discretion, courts have tended to inter-
pret the "sex" class narrowly. 93 For example, sex discrimination includes
discrimination against a person for his or her biological sex but not for his
or her sexual preference or orientation. 94
One way that victims of sexual orientation discrimination have found
some relief through the court system is by characterizing the harassment
or disparate treatment as discrimination based not on sexual orientation,
but rather on sex.95 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. is the
seminal case that solidified the existence of same-sex sexual harassment
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
89. See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001);
DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327,329-30 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated by Nichols
v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
90. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9 (1989), superseded by stat-
ute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf
v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
91. See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., Teaching with Documents: The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://
www.archives.gov/education/lessons/civil-rights-act/ (last visited May 26, 2012).
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 205, 213
(2009).
95. Kristin M. Bovalino, Note, How the Effeminate Male Can Maximize His Odds of
Winning Title VII Litigation, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1117, 1134 (2003).
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as actionable under Title VII. 96 To make out a prima facie sexual harass-
ment claim, the plaintiff must show that he or she "(1) is a member of a
protected class, (2) received unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) based on
sex, (4) that affected a term or condition of employment, and (5) the
employer knew or should have known about the harassment and did not
take steps to correct it."'97 The Supreme Court noted that that the harass-
ment could be motivated by the harasser's sexual desire for another em-
ployee of the same sex or by general hostility toward the presence of
members of the same sex in the workplace.98
Perhaps the greatest tool for a homosexual plaintiff to establish a dis-
crimination claim under Title VII is the most recent addition to the recog-
nized same-sex harassment and discrimination claims: the failure to
conform to gender stereotypes. The Supreme Court recognized this claim
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.99 In that case a female claimant success-
fully proved that she was a victim of unlawful sex discrimination because
she had been denied a promotion based on her failure to conform to com-
mon female stereotypes because she was "macho," used "foul language,"
and did not dress or speak like a "lady" should.100 Although Price
Waterhouse did not feature an issue about sexual orientation, the case
stands for the premise that harassment or discrimination based on the
victim's perceived failure to comply with gender stereotypes can form the
basis for a legally cognizable claim under Title VII. Since Price
Waterhouse, homosexual employees (or those perceived to be homosex-
ual) have used this gender-stereotype claim with increasing success. 10 1
While the federal courts have held that such claims are actionable under
Title VII, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to overcome the allegation that
he or she is using this type of claim to "bootstrap" onto the statute-that
is, to disguise a sexual orientation discrimination claim as a gender-stere-
otyping claim. 10 2 Kristin M. Bovalino notes that "[c]ourts are more re-
ceptive to claims of overtly fashioned gender stereotyping," so
In this Article, I refer to "sex" as the biological designation of a person as male or
female, most often associated with the expression of sexual genitalia. "Gender" refers to
cultural or socially constructed characteristics and stereotypes that are typically associated
with femininity and masculinity. "Sexual orientation" is a person's sexual interest in a
member of the opposite sex, the same sex, or both sexes. See Todd Brower, Social Cogni-
tion "at Work": Schema Theory and Lesbian and Gay Identity in Title VII, 18 L. & SEXUAL-
ITY 1, 5 n.15 (2009); Clancy, supra note 6, at 121.
96. See 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
97. Anthony E. Varona & Jeffrey M. Monks, Engendering Equality: Seeking Relief
Under Title VII Against Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 7 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 67, 73 (2000).
98. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
99. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
100. Id. at 234-35.
101. See, e.g., Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224
(D. Or. 2002); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 581 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S.
1001 (1998); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2009).
102. Bovalino, supra note 95, at 1124; Clancy, supra note 6, at 129-30; Kramer, supra
note 6, at 473.
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homosexual plaintiffs who otherwise conform to gender stereotypes will
have particular difficulty succeeding under this type of claim. a0 3
To differentiate between a sexual harassment claim and a gender-stere-
otype claim, Zachary A. Kramer has outlined the following rule: "If an
employer acts upon stereotypes about sexual roles in making employ-
ment decisions, or allows the use of these stereotypes in the creations of a
hostile or abusive work environment, then the employer opens itself up
to liability under Title VII's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
sex."'104 Although the gender-stereotype claim currently aids only those
plaintiffs who fail to conform-namely, "effeminate men and masculine
women, many of whom are gay or lesbian"-it provides a way to estab-
lish discrimination "because of sex."105 However, employers can survive
this loophole by showing that the discrimination was really not because of
the failure to conform to gender stereotypes but because of the claimant's
unprotected sexual orientation. 0 6 Although some scholars have ad-
vanced the theory that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
just a broad kind of gender-stereotype discrimination because
homophobia and heterosexism reflect a "manifestation of misogyny and
patriarchal gender norms," few courts have yet to embrace this theory. 10 7
This theory asserts that the harasser's desire to enforce societal gender
norms (i.e., heterosexuality) sexual-orientation harassment often moti-
vates; by allowing the gender-stereotype claim to fall under Title VII,
some scholars assert courts have essentially already allowed sexual-orien-
tation discrimination claims to fall under Title VII as well. 0 8
While the boundaries between sex and sexual orientation discrimina-
tion are anything but clear, the fact that Title VII does not protect against
sexual orientation discrimination does not affect whether a religious indi-
vidual may harass or discriminate against a homosexual or perceived ho-
mosexual because of his or her sexual orientation. Rather, this type of
discrimination falls under the "religion" prong of Title VII. Title VII not
only protects those practicing a religion from discrimination but also pro-
vides a back door to protection for other employees because the em-
ployer may be able to claim that any reasonable accommodation would
cause undue hardship by creating a hostile environment for the other em-
103. Bovalino, supra note 95, at 1131.
104. Kramer, supra note 6, at 487.
105. Recent Case, Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, 256 F.3 864 (9th Cir.
2001), 115 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 2077, 2079 (2002).
For an in-depth discussion of how transgendered and transsexual plaintiffs have sought
protection under the "because of sex" language, see Laura Grenfell, Embracing Law's
Categories: Anti-Discrimination Laws and Transgenderism, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51
(2003).
106. Recent Case, supra note 105, at 2079-80.
107. Varona & Monks, supra note 97, at 81-88, 125 & n.318 (noting that while the
Seventh Circuit has been one of the most open courts to accept the linkage between gen-
der stereotyping and homophobia, the court retreated from this path in Hamner v. St.
Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000), in which it delineated
a strong distinction between sex and sexual orientation).
108. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 492.
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ployees.' 0 9 One of the ways that this type of claim manifests itself is
when employees wish to practice their religion at work in a way that of-
fends other employees-in this case, LGBT employees. An employer
can demonstrate undue hardship by showing that an accommodation
would negatively affect the religious employee's coworkers in some
way.110 However, the circuit courts disagree over the relevance of the
inconvenience to other employees in the analysis of the reasonable
accommodation. 1 '
The movement toward allowing LGBT plaintiffs to bring gender-stere-
otype claims has varied by jurisdiction, although the Seventh Circuit has
made some headway:
Presently, the Seventh Circuit, more than any other jurisdiction, has
begun to eliminate the barriers traditionally faced by gay plaintiffs in
making Title VII claims by de-emphasizing congressional intent, in-
terpreting "sex" to include socially constructed characteristics, and
focusing more on the content of the discrimination rather than the
specific motive."l 2
Outside the courts, private employers are also taking the initiative to in-
troduce broad, zero tolerance antidiscrimination and harassment policies:
"As of September 2009, 434 (87%) of the Fortune 500 companies had
implemented non-discrimination policies that include sexual orientation,
and 207 (41%) had policies that include gender identity.""13 In addition,
over twenty states have enacted their own laws prohibiting discrimination
because of sexual orientation in employment. 1 4 However, according to
the Human Rights Campaign, it is still legal in twenty-nine states to fire
someone solely because he or she is lesbian, gay, or bisexual, and it is
legal in thirty-four states to fire someone because he or she is trans-
gendered or a transsexual. 1 5
Religious institutions enjoy special protections under the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution,
which states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 11 6 The Su-
preme Court has held that "only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion.""17 Title VII also provides an exemption for relig-
ious corporations and educational institutions "with respect to the em-
109. See Spoor, supra note 39, at 998.
110. Kaminer, supra note 61, at 617.
111. Id. at 621.
112. Varona & Monks, supra note 97, at 125.
113. Who Supports ENDA, HUMAN RIGrS CAMPAIGN, http://sites.hrc.org/sites/pas-
sendanow/who supportsENDA.asp (last visited July 12, 2012).
114. Kate B. Rhodes, Defending ENDA: The Ramifications of Omitting the BFOQ De-
fense in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 19 L. & SEXUALITY 1, 2-3 (2010).
115. Pass ENDA Now Index, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://sites.hrc.org/sites/pas-
sendanow/index.asp (last visited July 8, 2012).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
117. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
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ployment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educa-
tional institution, or society of its activities. ' 118 For example, section 702
permits religious organizations to discriminate against individuals in the
application for jobs by limiting acceptable employees to those who are
members of its own religion, even if the job itself is not religious in
function.' 1 9
The construction of the First Amendment imposes limitations on the
power of states to establish their own antidiscrimination laws.120 One ar-
ticle pinpoints the tension between a state's power to ban discrimination
and a religious group's freedom to practice its beliefs as provided under
the First Amendment, which is also the subject of this Comment.' 21 For
instance, in Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church of San Fran-
cisco, the court found that although a local ordinance prohibited discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation, a church did not unlawfully
terminate an organist's employment when it learned of his homosexual-
ity.1 22 Recognizing that the Supreme Court values religious freedom as
having a "preferred position in the pantheon of constitutional rights," the
court held that the church was exempt from any liability for discrimina-
tion because of the religious nature of the job. 2 3 Thus, the intersection
of the Equal Protection Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and state and
federal laws that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination pose a unique
legal problem that still has not been resolved.
The First Amendment and the exemption provisions provided in Title
VII allow religious employers to discriminate on the basis of religion and
certainly on the basis of sexual orientation. 24 Title VII exempts from its
antidiscrimination policies any educational institution that is owned or
managed by a religious entity, teaches a particular religious, curriculum,
or has a bona fide need for an employee to practice a specific religion to
adequately perform the functions of the job.125 In addition, certain cases
will fall under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment and thereby escape analysis under Title VII.'2 6
Because the states do not support LGBT employees uniformly, or even
in a majority, the best hope for LGBT plaintiffs seeking protection in the
workplace may be the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA),
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2006).
119. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) ("Congress acted with a legitimate purpose in
expanding the § 702 exemption to cover all activities of religious employers.").
120. Development in the Law: Employment Discrimination, Statutory Protection for
Gays and Lesbians in Private Employment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1625, 1638 (1996).
121. See id.
122. No. 760-028, 1980 WL 4657, at *1-4 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1980).
123. Id. at *4-5.
124. Ralph D. Mawdsley, Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Religion: Where
Should the Line Be Drawn?, 111 W.'s EDuc. L. REP. 1077, 1077 (1996).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006).
126. See Mawdsley, supra note 124, at 1082.
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which is "pending federal legislation that would ban employment discrim-
ination based on an individual's sexual orientation. 1 27 Although ENDA
has been proposed in Congress multiple times, its supporters have not yet
succeeded in securing its passage. 128 Most recently, "ENDA was intro-
duced in the 112th Congress on April 6, 2011, by Representative Barney
Frank in the House (H.R. 1397) and on April 13, 2011, by Senator Jeff
Merkley in the Senate (S. 811)," and it is awaiting review.129 ENDA
would not only protect employees from adverse employment decisions
based on their sexual orientation or gender identity but also on their as-
sociation with a particular relative or friend who happens to be LGBT. 130
Notably, while ENDA would seek to extend roughly the same types of
protection to LGBT plaintiffs as are afforded to claimants under Title VII
for race, national origin, and the like, ENDA also contains considerable
exclusions for religious organizations' 3' and the military.' 32 Indeed,
while religious organizations may be one area of employment in which
homosexuals risk being subject to the most discrimination, ENDA ex-
empts religious organizations from the duty not to discriminate against
LGBT employees or applicants.' 33 For example, although courts have
held that "customer preference" is not a reasonable justification for an
employer's discrimination against an employee, it is unclear whether this
kind of justification would be acceptable under ENDA.134
One final way homosexual plaintiffs have sought protection from sex-
ual orientation discrimination is through the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 135 This may apply to public employees sub-
jected to discrimination. 136 Although courts have yet to find that homo-
sexuals are a suspect class under this Amendment, the Supreme Court in
Romer v. Evans did apply the Equal Protection Clause to strike down an
127. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/hiv-aids-lgbt-
rights/employment-non-discrimination-act (last visited July 8, 2012).
128. See id.; J. Banning Jasiunas, Note, Is ENDA the Answer? Can a "Separate but
Equal" Federal Statute Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimi-
nation?, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1529, 1535-36 (2000).
129. Pass ENDA Now: Learn More, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://sites.hrc.org/
sites/passendanow/learn more.asp (last visited July 8, 2012).
130. Edward J. Reeves & Lainie D. Decker, Before ENDA: Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity Protections in the Workplace Under Federal Law, 20 L. & SEXUALITY 61,
77 (2011).
131. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1397, 112 Cong. § 6 (2011). Specifi-
cally, section 6 of ENDA provides that, "[tihis Act shall not apply to a corporation, associ-
ation, educational institution, or society that is exempt from the religious discrimination
provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 pursuant to section 702(a) or
703(e)(2) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-l(a); 2000e-2(e)(2))". Id.
132. Id. § 7. Section 7 exempts the military from this statute, but with the recent repeal
of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," this provision could be altered or removed from the bill before
passage. Id.
133. Jasiunas, supra note 128, at 1553.
134. Id. at 1556.
135. Id. at 1540. The Equal Protection Clause states that "[n]o State shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend
XIV, § 1.
136. See, e.g., Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 319, 320, 325 (E.D.N.Y.
2002).
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amendment to Colorado's state constitution as unconstitutional. 137 The
amendment prohibited all state action that sought to protect homosexuals
from discrimination.1 38  The Supreme Court found that, indeed,
"[h]omosexuals, by state decree, [were] put in a solitary class with respect
to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental
spheres. '139 The Court concluded that the main thrust of the amendment
was to deny homosexuals the equal protection of the law, which is prohib-
ited by the U.S. Constitution, and thus invalidated the amendment.' 40
Although Romer did not touch on whether the Equal Protection Clause
can be violated when a state discriminates against its employees on the
basis of sexual orientation, various state courts have examined this ques-
tion and answered it in the affirmative.1 41 On the other hand, many op-
ponents to expanding the rights of LGBT employees, and to LGBT
persons in general, do not view homosexuality as a matter of identity but
rather of choice (and one that should be corrected, for that matter). For
example, one scholar argues that "homosexual behavior is merely one of
countless activities left unprotected by antidiscrimination laws." '142
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF RELIGION AND SEXUAL
ORIENTATION IN EMPLOYMENT
Perhaps the most informative case to determine how courts will rule
when a religious employee exhibits antihomosexual behavior is Peterson
v. Hewlett-Packard Co. 143 In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that a
religious employee did not suffer any disparate treatment when he was
terminated for displaying antihomosexual scripture in his cubicle. 144 In
response to his company's poster display promoting diversity in the work-
place, which included gay employees, Peterson, a Christian who believed
that homosexuality was prohibited by the Bible, posted two Biblical scrip-
tures in his cubicle that condemned homosexuality.145 One of the scrip-
tures was a passage from Isaiah describing Sodomites as having
"rewarded evil unto themselves;" the other featured a passage from Le-
viticus stating: "If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman,
both of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to
death; their blood shall be put upon them.' 1 46 Although these passages
directly contravened Hewlett-Packard's company-wide antiharassment
policy, Peterson refused to remove the postings as long as the diversity
137. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
138. Id. at 624.
139. Id. at 627.
140. Id. at 635.
141. See, e.g., Quinn v. Nassau Cnty. Police Dep't, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 356-58 (E.D.N.Y.
1999); Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1290 (D. Utah 1998).
142. Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legisla-
tion, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 393, 400 (1994).
143. 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004).
144. Id. at 601-02, 605.
145. Id. at 601-02.
146. Id.
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posters remained on display, claiming that God and the Bible imposed
upon him "a duty to expose evil when confronted with sin."'147
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the only accommodations that Peter-
son deemed acceptable to his religious beliefs would have imposed undue
hardship on the company; therefore, it denied Peterson's failure-to-ac-
commodate claim. 148 Peterson stated that he would keep the postings up
while Hewlett-Packard displayed the diversity posters, but this proposal
would have imposed undue hardship on the company because allowing
Peterson to display the hurtful and even violent messages would have
violated the company's antiharassment policy and deprived his coworkers
of contractual and statutory rights. 149 On the other hand, removing the
diversity posters would have limited the company's ability to hire and
support a diverse workforce, which it viewed as vital to its commercial
success.150 The court concluded that "[w]hile Hewlett-Packard must tol-
erate some degree of employee discomfort in the process of taking steps
required by Title VII to correct the wrongs of discrimination, it need not
accept the burdens that would result from allowing actions that demean
or degrade ... members of its workforce."' 15
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit held in Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc. that an em-
ployee terminated for violating her company's harassment policy by con-
demning a subordinate's homosexuality through religious comments did
not suffer any disparate treatment. 52 Evelyn Bodett worked for
CoxCom and its predecessor for eighteen years, during which time she
supervised Kelley Carson, who was openly gay.153 While supervising
Carson, Bodett made several statements concerning Carson's homosexu-
ality, including "God's design for a relationship was between a man and a
woman" and "homosexuality is wrong, [and] considered by God to be a
sin.' 54 Bodett cautioned Carson that "she would be disappointed if Car-
son were dating another woman[] but happy if she were dating a
man."'1 55 CoxCom's General Harassment Policy and "Corrective Action
Policy" stated that "[n]o employee shall harass another employee on the
basis of ... sexual orientation." Finding a "gross violation" of this policy,
CoxCom terminated Bodett's employment.' 56
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Bodett's language explicitly
violated CoxCom's harassment policy and no evidence suggested that the
company terminated Bodett merely because of her religious beliefs. Fur-
thermore, the court held that Bodett may "freely exercise her First
Amendment rights [of free speech and freedom of religion] as long as
147. Id. at 602, 606 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. at 607-08.
149. Id. at 606-07.
150. Id. at 608.
151. Id. at 607-08.
152. 366 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2004).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 741 (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 741-42.
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such exercise does not infringe on the rights of others by manifesting dis-
crimination prohibited by Cox's harassment policy. ' 15 7 This court's hold-
ing implicitly supports the idea that other employees may find protection
from religious harassment because it infringes on the employer's ability
to provide a nonhostile work environment. It is noteworthy, however,
that the court acknowledged that Bodett did not raise a claim for failure
to provide reasonable accommodations in this case.
158
A 2011 Seventh Circuit case shows that some employers will not toler-
ate harassment on the basis of sexual orientation even if it arises from the
harasser's purported religious belief.159 Tanisha Matthews sued her for-
mer employer for religious discrimination after she was terminated for
violating Wal-Mart's Discrimination and Harassment Prevention Pol-
icy.1 60 Matthews was an Apostolic Christian who believed that homosex-
uality is a sin and that homosexuals will go to hell.161 During a break in
September 2005, Matthews engaged in a discussion about homosexuality
with several coworkers, including an openly gay coworker, in which she
screamed that "God does not accept gays," "they will 'go to hell,"' and
"they should not 'be on earth."162 Wal-Mart's Discrimination and Har-
assment Prevention Policy stated that employees may not "engag[e] in
conduct that could reasonably be interpreted as harassment based on an
individual's status, including sexual orientation. ' 163 After an investiga-
tion, Wal-Mart concluded that Matthews violated this policy with her vit-
riolic speech and terminated her employment. 1
64
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart af-
ter finding that Wal-Mart did not discriminate against Matthews because
of her religion and that no similarly situated employees were treated dif-
ferently.1 65 Affirming the district court's ruling, the Seventh Circuit ac-
knowledged that Matthews waived any failure-to-accommodate claim by
not raising it at the trial stage.166 However, the court nevertheless ana-
lyzed Matthews's claim under this theory, explaining that "employers
need not relieve workers from complying with neutral workplace rules as
a religious accommodation if it would create an undue hardship." 167 Ac-
commodating Matthews by allowing her to use such clearly harassing lan-
guage would put Wal-Mart at extreme risk of liability for harassment suits
from other employees. 168 Moreover, the court concluded that Matthews
was not subject to disparate treatment because although none of the
157. Id. at 748.
158. Id. at 740.











other employees who participated in the conversation were fired, none of
them used language that touched on a person's individual sexual orienta-
tion status. 169 Because Matthews could not even support a prima facie
claim of religious discrimination, the court upheld summary judgment.
On the other hand, in Buonanno v. AT&T Broadband, LLC, a plaintiff
prevailed on his religious discrimination claim after he was terminated for
refusing to sign his employer's Diversity Policy, which was a condition for
continued employment.1 70 Buonanno was a Christian who followed the
literal language of the Bible and believed that the text prohibited him
from "approving, endorsing, or esteeming behavior or values that are re-
pudiated by Scripture."' 171 Although Buonanno was required to sign a
company-wide Diversity Policy, he refused because it contained the
phrase, "Each person at AT&T Broadband is charged with the responsi-
bility to fully recognize, respect and value the differences among all of
us." '172 Buonanno wrote a letter to his Human Resources Manager ex-
plaining that although his religious beliefs prevented him from "valu[ing]
any differences [that] are contrary to God's word," he would continue to
conduct himself in a professional manner and would not discriminate
against or harass any individual with whose beliefs or lifestyle he did not
agree.173 Although testimony during the trial revealed that his chief con-
cern centered around his disagreement with homosexuality, Buonanno
never discussed this concern with his managers when he refused to sign
the policy. 174 After a series of discussions, the company terminated
Buonanno's employment, and he sued for direct religious discrimination
and failure to accommodate.1 75
The district court found that while Buonanno satisfied the first two ele-
ments of the prima facie religious discrimination claim-he suffered an
adverse employment action and at the time the action was taken, his per-
formance was satisfactory-he could not satisfy the third element. He
could not establish "an inference that the employment actions were taken
because of a discriminatory motive based upon [his] failure to hold or
follow his .. .employer's religious beliefs." 176
However, the court found that Buonanno did establish his prima facie
failure-to-accommodate claim because he had a bona fide religious belief
that conflicted with the requirement to sign the Diversity Policy, he in-
formed AT&T of that conflict, and he was terminated for his failure to
comply.177 Because he had proved his prima facie case, the burden
shifted to AT&T to show that it offered a reasonable accommodation or
169. Id. at 554-55.
170. 313 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1076-77, 1083 (D. Colo. 2004).
171. Id. at 1074.
172. Id. at 1074-75.
173. Id. at 1075-76.
174. Id. at 1076 n.1.
175. Id. at 1076.
176. Id. at 1080.
177. Id. at 1081.
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was unable to provide a reasonable accommodation without experiencing
undue hardship.' 78 AT&T failed to offer any accommodation, nor did
Buonanno' s managers thoroughly investigate the perceived conflict that
he had with the company policy.1 7 9 If they had, they would have discov-
ered that he interpreted the word "value" literally, while the company
only required their employees to value their coworkers figuratively.' 80
This misunderstanding led the company to believe that Buonanno' s be-
liefs created an undue hardship because allowing employees to selectively
accept or deny portions of the Diversity Policy would make uniform en-
forcement of the policy impossible.181 By not exploring accommodation
options, the company violated Title VII.182 Accordingly, the court
awarded Buonanno back pay, lost 401(k) contributions, prejudgment in-
terest, damages for emotional distress, and approximately three years'
worth of front pay (compensating him for damage to his earning
capacity). 183
Similarly, in Phillips v. Collings, a social service worker named Phillips,
whose job involved licensing and assigning foster parents to children, was
found to have been discriminated against when his supervisor recom-
mended his termination after he revealed that his religious belief that
"homosexuality was an abomination" prevented him from licensing ho-
mosexual persons as foster parents. 184 Although Phillips brought a Sec-
tion 1983 claim rather than a religious discrimination claim under Title
VII, this case is still informative because Phillips alleged that his em-
ployer should have offered him a reasonable accommodation for his re-
ligious beliefs. 185
The court of appeals found that because homosexual couples were only
very rarely licensed as foster parents, Phillips's request not to deal with
homosexual couples would have had very little impact on his job func-
tions and on the function of the business as a whole.186 This case is in-
structive because it reveals that a court will find a failure to accommodate
when the employer inflicts an adverse employment action on the em-
ployee before exploring reasonable accommodations. 187
In a Fifth Circuit case involving a psychological counselor who declined
to advise a homosexual client on her relationship because it would con-
flict with the counselor's religious beliefs, the court held that accommo-
dating her needs would impose more than a de minimis cost on her
employer and therefore was an undue hardship.188 Accordingly, the em-
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1082.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1083.
183. Id. at 1085-86.
184. 256 F.3d 843, 845-47 (8th Cir. 2001).
185. Id. at 846, 850-51.
186. Id. at 850.
187. See id. at 850-51.
188. Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 497, 503 (5th Cir. 2001).
SMU LAW REVIEW
ployer was not liable for failing to accommodate the counselor. 189 The
counselor objected to advising her patient on her homosexual relation-
ship, but the Medical Center explained that because it cannot know all of
the characteristics of a patient before he or she is assigned to a counselor,
it could not assign patients to Bruff based upon her unwillingness to deal
with homosexuals, and that this would most likely risk creating an unbal-
anced workload for other employees. 190
The jury in the trial court found that Bruff had indeed suffered relig-
ious discrimination through the Medical Center's failure to accommo-
date.191 However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment, finding that
although Bruff established her prima facie claim of religious discrimina-
tion, she could not prevail on her failure-to-accommodate claim. 192
Bruff's contention that "under Title VII the Medical Center must excuse
her from counseling on all subjects of concern at all times" was simply
impossible to reasonably accommodate without imposing undue hardship
on the employer. 193 The counselor was given the opportunity to transfer
to another division where she could see only Christian patients, which
would have been a reasonable accommodation, but she declined this offer
and therefore was not entitled to any remedy.194
V. EMPLOYERS ON THE TIGHTROPE: HOW TITLE VII
PROTECTIONS PLAY OUT
So far, this Comment has discussed (1) the historical background of the
federal protections-and lack of protections-for religious and homosex-
ual employees and (2) the current state of the law. But how does the
contemporary private employer navigate the waters of Title VII when the
needs of its employees may often contradict or even outright upset each
other?
Returning to the hypothetical at the beginning of this article, let us yet
again consider the conflict between Richard and Susan. Richard gave
Susan a pamphlet condemning homosexuality as against God's word.
The telephone company does not need to understand Richard's religious
belief or even be morally aligned with it.195 But just because Richard's
behavior may be characterized as proselytization, this does not automati-
cally mean that the company has no duty to support his needs. For in-
stance, in Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Industries, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that because an evangelical Christian employer held
a sincere belief that he had a "religious duty to tell others, especially non-
Christians, about God and sinful conduct, '196 the employer had an af-
189. Id. at 503.
190. Id. at 497.
191. Id. at 499.
192. Id. at 501.
193. Id. at 500.
194. Id. at 502-03.
195. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216-17, 220 (1972).
196. 903 P.2d 351, 353, 363 (Or. 1995) (en banc).
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firmative defense to this conduct, despite the discomfort it caused his em-
ployee.197 In Richard's case, if the company decides to terminate his
employment, he may have a wrongful termination claim stemming from
the company's failure to accommodate his needs. Perhaps the company
should attempt to accommodate Richard's needs by allowing him to dis-
play the pamphlets in his office, making them free for any interested co-
worker to access if he or she so chooses. Or perhaps the telephone
company could offer Richard a space where he may discuss his religious
convictions with other employees during nonwork time. If the company
instead offered Richard the option of discussing his religious beliefs at the
end of mandatory meetings, for example, this may create a hostile envi-
ronment for his fellow employees. 198
On the other hand, the employer may be able to claim that even such
seemingly innocuous accommodations impose an undue hardship on its
business since the Hardison de minimis standard has such a low thresh-
old.1 99 The employer could provide evidence that Richard's behavior
threatens productivity by distracting or infuriating his coworkers. 20 0 Be-
cause the duty to accommodate is a two-way street, where both the em-
ployer and the employee must compromise to find a solution that
supports the employee's beliefs while preventing the employer from suf-
fering undue hardship, if Richard's convictions are so rigid that no ac-
commodation will properly serve his needs, he will not succeed on a
failure-to-accommodate claim.20 l
Meanwhile, under the peculiar nature of the law, Susan may-indi-
rectly-have some relief against the hostile work environment that Rich-
ard's behavior has produced. Recall that the Title VII provision
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion also protects nonreli-
gious employees from religious practices that unduly invade the general
work environment. For instance, as the court held in Wilson v. U.S. West
Communications, even if an employer must reasonably accommodate an
employee's religious beliefs, the employee is not thereby free to impose
his or her beliefs on others.2 0 2 Arguably, Richard's behavior constitutes
even greater harassment than the plaintiff's button-wearing in Wilson be-
cause he is not only displaying his religious beliefs but also forcing them
on Susan by giving her the pamphlet.20 3 However, because the company
(1) is in a state in which no antidiscrimination law protects against sexual-
orientation discrimination and (2) does not have its own internal discrimi-
nation and harassment policy addressing this issue, the federal religious
protections may allow Richard to prevail, while Susan is left to work in an
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Young v. Sw. Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 145 (5th Cir. 1975).
199. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977).
200. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341-42 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting
that imposing one's religious views on unwilling coworkers is not a religious belief that
requires accommodation).
201. See Hudson v. W. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 261, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1988).
202. 58 F.3d at 1341.
203. See id.
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environment that is distasteful at best and threatening at worst. The bot-
tom line is that an employer can offer a legitimate business reason, such
as the protection of human capital, in order to regulate Richard's behav-
ior, but Susan still lacks any affirmative right to relief should the em-
ployer fail to do so.
Next, let's change the fact pattern slightly. Richard is Susan's supervi-
sor. During a performance review, Richard tells Susan that while her job
performance has been satisfactory, he hopes that she will embrace heter-
osexuality because it is God's way. Richard has been continuously point-
ing out his dissatisfaction with Susan's homosexuality, urging her to read
scriptures and visit his church to seek enlightenment. He has not changed
his treatment of her, but she has become increasingly uncomfortable and
quits, believing that Richard is going to fire her for being a lesbian in any
case. Can Susan prevail in a suit against the telephone company, alleging
that she suffered a hostile work environment and was constructively
discharged?
The Northern District Court of California examined this question in
Erdmann v. Tranquility Inc.20 4 Plaintiff Del Erdmann, a gay man who
quit his job as a registered nurse, alleged that he was constructively dis-
charged because he had been forced to suffer a hostile work environment
by his Mormon employer, who believed that homosexuality was a sin.20 5
For instance, the employer instructed Erdmann to meet with a supervis-
ing nurse, who told him that the company viewed homosexuals as im-
moral and indecent and that although he was in a monogamous
relationship with his partner, he "just better stay in that monogamous
relationship or else something bad is going to happen to [him]." 2 °6
Erdmann testified that the comments made him scared that he would lose
his job. 20 7 Moreover, the employer tried to convince Erdmann to be-
come a heterosexual Mormon so that she would see him in Heaven. 20 8
The accumulation of these and other similar events, such as being led
daily in morning prayer, led Erdmann to feel unwelcome and to later
resign.20 9
The district court held that Erdmann satisfied the adverse employment
action prong of the Title VII religious discrimination claim, finding that
the hostile work environment led to a constructive discharge. 210 There-
fore, the court declined to grant the employer's motion for summary
judgment on the religious discrimination claim.21n
Erdmann closely resembles our hypothetical. Although Richard has
not made any statements suggesting that Susan would be fired because of
204. 155 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1159 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
205. Id. at 1154.
206. Id. at 1156-57.
207. Id. at 1157.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1165.
211. Id. at 1167.
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her homosexuality, the fact that he has brought up his antipathy toward
homosexuality during her performance review suggests that she will likely
suffer some adverse employment action in the future, be it the termina-
tion of her employment or failure to grant her an otherwise deserved
promotion. Depending on the court, Susan may have a hostile-environ-
ment claim because Richard's behavior has created a hostile work envi-
ronment for his subordinate. The Ninth Circuit, for example, evaluates
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether "a reasonable per-
son in the employee's position would have felt that he was forced to quit
because of intolerable and discriminatory working conditions. '2 12 A rea-
sonable person would likely feel that Susan was forced to stop working at
the telephone company because of Richard's persistent recommendations
that she change her sexual orientation. However, while Susan may have
a claim in the Ninth Circuit2 13 she still has absolutely no federal protec-
tion under Title VII.
Let's change our hypothetical again. Now, Richard is again Susan's
coworker (not supervisor), and he tells her that he does not like working
with her because she is a "dyke" and he finds her homosexuality "unnatu-
ral." Richard does not claim that these beliefs are based on any sort of
religious conviction, and in fact, Richard considers himself an atheist.
Remember, we are in a vacuum-the company does not have an internal
antiharassment policy, and that state does not have any laws protecting
against sexual-orientation discrimination. Susan complains to her super-
visor that Richard is tormenting her, but the supervisor tells her that be-
sides asking Richard to refrain from using such language, his hands are
tied. Does Susan have any sort of discrimination claim under federal
law?
This is where the holes in Title VII really become apparent. Although
a religious employee has many protections under federal law, the cases
mostly suggest that an employer does not have to tolerate inappropriate
or abusive conduct that creates a hostile environment, especially when it
will seriously affect other employees.2 1 4 But without the protective cloak
of the religious discrimination claim, the homosexual plaintiff is left na-
ked. Because Title VII does not cover sexual orientation, Susan's only
hope is to bring a gender-discrimination claim, alleging that Richard has
harassed her because of her failure to conform to typical female stereo-
types.2 15 However, unless Susan has other proof of this claim besides her
homosexuality, such as evidence that her masculine wardrobe or distate
212. Id. at 1165-66 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Watson v. Nationwide
Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1987)) .
213. See id.
214. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341-42 (8th Cir. 1995).
215. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v.
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994); see also Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563,
580-81 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Coun-
try Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212,1223-25 (D. Or. 2002); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579
F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2009).
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for makeup sparks taunting by coworers, the court is likely to conclude
that she is masquerading a sexual orientation discrimination claim as a
gender-discrimination claim.216 Because an employer can fire an at-will
employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all as long as it
does not contravene a statutory law or public policy, Susan could actually
be fired if her employer decides that her complaining disrupts the work-
place more than Richard's language. 217
Even conduct more egregious than Richard's often receives no punish-
ment under Title VII.218 For example, in 2011 the Sixth Circuit held that
a homosexual plaintiff could not satisfy his prima facie gender-discrimina-
tion claim when a fellow employee repeatedly called him a "faggot" and
threatened to stab him and any other homosexuals working with them.219
Despite the legitimate threat (supported by the fact that the coworker
was facing charges for actually stabbing several homosexuals in Atlanta),
the plaintiff's union employer never addressed the issue at all and even
stopped referring the employee for jobs.220 The plaintiff brought a gen-
der-discrimination claim, alleging that his coworker harassed him for his
failing to conform to male stereotypes, namely by being a homosexual.
As a matter of law, the Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that the plain-
tiff merely brought "a 'formulaic recitation' of the elements of a sex-ster-
eotyping cause of action. '221 Essentially, the court's hands were tied. It
acknowledged the ludicrous results stemming from Title VII's omission of
LGBT discrimination: "Although many States prohibit sexual-orientation
discrimination, federal law and Tennessee law do not. ' 222 This decision
illustrates the moral and equal rights problems that Title VII sometimes
produces-the court itself disclosed that while the law may have com-
pelled its holding, it flies in the face of our society's larger concepts of
equal protection and dignity for all.
The harassment that Susan suffered at the hands of Richard in our last
hypothetical does not even approach the severity and pervasiveness of
the harassment that many homosexual (or perceived homosexual) em-
ployees often suffer. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that Susan could find
any protection whatsoever under federal law, leaving her with very few
options-either continue working in the hostile environment or jeopard-
ize her career by seeking other employment, in which there is no guaran-
tee that she will escape harassment. 223 Moreover, it is possible to imagine
216. See Bovalino, supra note 95, at 1124; Clancy, supra note 6, at 129-30; Kramer,
supra note 6, at 473-74.
217. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Health Mgmt. Assocs. of W. Va., Inc., 672 S.E.2d 395, 401 (W.
Va. 2008); Shero v. Grand Sav. Bank, 161 P.3d 298, 300 (Okla. 2007); Porterfield v. Mascari
II, Inc., 823 A.2d 590, 596 (Md. 2003).
218. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Country Music Ass'n, 432 F. App'x 516, 518 (6th Cir. 2011).
219. Id. at 520.
220. Id. at 518.
221. Id. at 520.
222. Id. (citations omitted).
223. See, e.g., Moore v. USG Corp., No. 2:10CV00066-NBB-SAA, 2011 WL 4386246, at
*14-15 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 20, 2011) (holding that despite being regularly subjected to verbal
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a situation in which a religious employee creates a hostile work environ-
ment for a homosexual employee, or even for employees who support
homosexuality and find the religious employee's behavior morally offen-
sive, but in which the religious employee fails to disclose the religious
nature of his conduct. If Richard calls Susan a "dyke" because he feels
that it is the best way to communicate God's supposed disdain for homo-
sexuality, Susan would have no legal recourse if the telephone company
condoned Richard's behavior. However, if the company does choose to
discipline Richard, it would probably not be held liable if he brought a
disparate-treatment or religious-accommodation claim because the com-
pany could justify its action through the legitimate business reason of pro-
tecting its human capital by preventing a hostile work environment. On
the other hand, if Richard never tells his coworkers of his deeply held
religious convictions, or that he is even a Christian for that matter, his
employer or a court receiving Susan's discrimination claim could view
this as simply sexual-orientation harassment, which is permissible under
the law. Even if one does not agree that sexual-orientation discrimina-
tion deserves its own protection, it would be nearly impossible to deny
that these incongruities in the law create difficulty for employers trying to
comply with the law and in creating and enforcing their own internal dis-
crimination and harassment policies.
As one scholar points out, it was not too long ago in our history that
employers could freely discriminate against women who got married, be-
came pregnant, or had young children.22 4 But the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act,225 an amendment to Title VII, and other federal
antidiscrimination laws now prevent discrimination based on child-bear-
ing decisions, which would be virtually unimaginable today. We are not
at that point yet with regard to antidiscrimination laws addressing sexual
orientation and gender identity. Some scholars still insist that homosexu-
ality, or at least homosexual behavior rather than homosexual identity, is
not immutable and therefore does not deserve the same protections as
other protected statuses. 226
In one particularly vitriolic article, George W. Dent, Jr. claims that
people arguing for the rights of homosexuals intend not simply to prevent
discrimination and harassment but to "require people and institutions to
accept homosexuality regardless of their religious beliefs. '227 Noble as it
may seem, it is unlikely that proponents of a sexual orientation amend-
ment to Title VII have such lofty goals. Nor is forcing anyone to "accept"
homosexuality likely to promote the standards of fair and respectful
abuse and threats of physical abuse relating to his homosexuality, the plaintiff could not
support a gender-stereotyping claim under the current state of the law).
224. Stephen D. Sugarman, "Lifestyle" Discrimination in Employment, 24 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 387 (2003).
225. Id. at 387 & n.38.
226. George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religious Free-
dom, 95 Ky. L.J. 553, 636 (2007).
227. Id. at 555.
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treatment in the workplace, which purports to be the aim of Title VII.228
Rather, protecting sexual orientation in the workplace would level the
playing field as a humble assertion that LGBT individuals are entitled to
the same right to be free of harassment and discrimination in the work-
place as religious people who feel that they have been sent as messengers
of God to wage war on homosexuality, abortion, or other "moral"
issues. 2 2 9
This Comment does not suggest that the religious protections that are
already in place for employees should be lessened or eliminated. The
United States is a country that values religious diversity, and protecting
one's religious rights should take precedence over employer rights in
many cases. However, without providing equal protections for homosex-
uals in the workplace, religious convictions may be used as a tool to ad-
versely affect or disadvantage homosexual employees. Not long ago in
our nation's history, some people justified segregation with biblical de-
fenses.230 With the help of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, society has
shifted away from such hostility. Similarly, as is shown by the recent de-
velopments towards legalizing gay marriage, 231 our society is moving to-
ward general acceptance of homosexuality. 232 But without the aid
provided by antidiscrimination laws on a national level, it is harder for
homosexuals to gain equality. The sooner the federal government em-
braces the need for sexual-orientation protections in the workplace, the
sooner such discrimination will be eradicated in all areas of life.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite George W. Dent Jr.'s bald claims that "[m]ost people are re-
pelled by homosexuality" and that "[v]irtually all agree that discrimina-
tion based on homosexuality should sometimes be allowed, '2 33 most
people observing contemporary America would likely question where he
found these statistics. While many Americans believe that homosexuals
do not deserve certain rights available to all other Americans, such as the
right to marry, this does not automatically translate to an affirmation of
discrimination, especially in the workplace. The fact that 87% of Fortune
500 employers have internal antidiscrimination and harassment policies
that prohibit discriminatory conduct on the basis of sexual orientation
signals a need for protection under federal law. 2 34 Employers need
guidelines and boundaries by which they can regulate their business and
228. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2513-17.
229. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341-42 (8th Cir. 1995).
230. Mark Newman, The Arkansas Baptist State Convention and Desegregation,
1954-1968, 56 ARK. HIST. Q. 294, 295 (1997).
231. See, e.g., Araminta Wordsworth, Washington State the Latest to Sign up for Gay
Marriage, NAT'L POST (Feb. 15, 2012, 12:05 PM), http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/
2012/02/15/washington-state-the-latest-to-sign-up-for-gay-marriage/.
232. See id.
233. Dent, Jr., supra note 226, at 631, 642.
234. See Who Supports ENDA, supra note 113.
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maintain a healthy working environment for all employees. Regardless
of whether a certain employer agrees with a particular religious belief or
homosexual lifestyle, the law does not require agreement for a status to
be protected. Rather, the law seeks to eliminate personal preference al-
together, such that employees may all have equal opportunity to succeed
in the workplace.
Title VII as it stands today produces incongruous and confusing results
when religious beliefs and sexual orientation collide in the workplace.
Religious employees are entitled to strong protections under the law, but
the religious basis for their harassment of other employees may actually
provide other employees with claims for religious harassment. On the
other hand, the worst kind of harassers-those with true bigotry against
others and who have no justification for their actions besides deep-seated
prejudices-may actually fly under the radar and continue in their behav-
ior because the law does not specifically prohibit harassment on the basis
of sexual orientation. While some states and some employers fill in the
gaps with their own statutes and internal policies, such an important basic
right should not be left so piecemeal. The federal government must take
control to create a uniform policy. Until then, people like Susan will con-
tinue to be treated like lesser employees, unworthy of the same protec-
tions as their coworkers.
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